Difficulty: Intermediate | Prerequisites: Weeks 1–2 notes (especially the intentional stance and theory-ladenness)
Week 3 moves from the external (how we study people) to the internal (what the "self" even is). It tackles why our intuitive sense of a unified, singular self is largely an illusion produced by the smooth coordination of many brain subsystems. It then explores how that self is socially constructed, how cultures shape whether the self is defined individually or collectively, and what happens when self-esteem is threatened. This week connects the scientific framework of Weeks 1–2 to the psychological life of the person being studied.
The self feels like a single, unified entity, but it is a convincing illusion produced by many independent brain subsystems working together. We build our sense of who we are through social observation, the same way we build our sense of who others are. Whether we define ourselves primarily through personal traits, relationships, or group memberships depends heavily on cultural context.
Cartesian dualism
The intuitive notion, derived from Descartes, that mind and body are metaphysically distinct entities: the mind somehow "inhabits" the body. Fits comfortably with folk psychology but poorly with empirical findings. Also known as the "ghost in the machine" view.
Material self
The attempt to explain the existence and sensations of the self in purely physical terms. Computational science in the 20th century showed that the mind is "matter in motion."
Experiential self ("I")
The subject of experience, the conscious locus at which perception, feeling, judgement and decision-making happen. Think of it as the "you" that is thinking right now, and the distinctive way that you think. Also called the phenomenal self or the self in-the-moment.
Narrative self ("Me")
An object of experience: the aspects of the self that are known, the informational content of who we are (knowledge, autobiographical memories, preferences, habits, even defining possessions). Also called the remembered self or the autobiographical self.
Illusory self
The universal consensus in psychology and materialist philosophy of mind that the singular, unitary self as we experience it is illusory. The self does exist, but its illusory property is that it appears to be something it is not: a single, unified entity, when it is really many independent subsystems coordinating smoothly.
Narrative centre of gravity
Daniel Dennett's term for the illusory self. Just as a centre of gravity is an abstract point summarising distributed weight, the self is a useful fiction summarising a wide range of facts and tendencies about a person, allowing us to employ the intentional stance efficiently.
Corpus callosum
The nerve bundle connecting the left and right brain hemispheres. When severed (split-brain patients), the hemispheres operate as two distinct brains that cannot internally share information, effectively behaving as two distinct selves.
Self-concept
The subset of autobiographical memories you string together to tell who you are. Draws extensively on cultural information and role-modelling.
Individual definition
Self defined in terms of personal beliefs, traits, abilities, preferences, tastes, talents and desires.
Relational definition
Self defined by relationships with others.
Collective definition
Self defined by membership in groups.
Individualism
A cultural orientation emphasising personal autonomy and individual rights. Largely a cultural invention of the modern nation state.
Collectivism
A cultural orientation emphasising group harmony, duty and interdependence. The older of the two orientations across human evolutionary history. Traditional societies are collectivist; East Asia and the Global South remain more collectivistic than the West.
Self-control / response inhibition
The ability to consciously redirect attention and cognitively reframe systematic thoughts to prevent an undesirable response from fully initiating. Depends on a subsystem of the prefrontal cortex responsible for impulse control.
Self-evaluation
The process of appraising how we are doing. Self-appraisal is the specific assessment; self-esteem is the global, baseline level.
State self-esteem
Your self-esteem at this exact moment, which fluctuates.
Trait self-esteem
The baseline level your self-esteem habitually returns to, supported by your self-narrative and physiological dispositions.
Sociometer theory of self-esteem
The theory that self-esteem is not a goal in itself but a gauge that tracks social acceptance. Low self-esteem inhibits adventurous, ambitious or socially challenging activities; high self-esteem encourages them.
Self-presentation
The deliberate steering of one's narrative self in desirable directions. This is a normal part of being a person, not inherently pathological or deceitful.
Cartesian dualism is the intuitive folk-psychological belief that mind and body are separate substances
Tied to religious conceptions of an immaterial soul
Fits our intuitions comfortably, but does not match empirical findings
Computational science revealed that the mind is "matter in motion," making a purely physical account of the self plausible
William James drew the earliest meaningful line between two aspects of the self:
"I" (experiential self): the subject of experience, the conscious locus where perception, feeling, judgement and decision-making happen. Your subjective perspective, the "you" thinking right now and the distinctive way you think.
"Me" (narrative self): an object of experience, the informational content of who you are: knowledge, autobiographical memories, preferences, habits, even defining possessions.
Losing memories means losing the narrative/remembered self. The experiential self is about processes; the narrative self is about content.
There is no "central meaner," no single homunculus directing traffic. Meaning emerges at the level of the system.
The singular, unitary self as we experience it is illusory. The self exists, but it appears to be something it is not: a single unified entity rather than the smooth coordination of many independent brain subsystems.
Daniel Dennett describes this as a narrative centre of gravity: a useful theoretical fiction that simplifies how we understand and predict the social world by summarising a wide range of facts and tendencies into a unitary, agential "self."
The corpus callosum connects the left and right hemispheres
When severed, the brain operates as two distinct brains that cannot share information internally
Split-brain patients behave as two distinct selves; they act the same only because of enormous overlap in environment and remembered history
Our sense of self is socially constructed
We commonly assume self-knowledge comes first and knowledge of others comes second, but empirical evidence suggests the reverse: we develop our narrative self by applying the same intuitive cognitive tools we use to understand other people to our own behaviour
Infants appear to discover the self as an object (not a subject) by inference from their parents' behaviour
None of us start with an intimate, well-informed self-concept; we build it through observation and experience, the same way we build our sense of others
Self-concept draws extensively on cultural information and role-modelling
All self-definitions contain elements of both individual and collective, but the emphasis varies along cultural lines
For most of human evolutionary history, social and political interests were collective; individual rights are a relatively recent cultural invention of the modern nation state
Traditional societies are collectivist; the West is more individualist
Three sources feed into self-concept in different proportions:
Individual definition: beliefs, traits, abilities, preferences
Relational definition: relationships with others
Collective definition: group memberships
Depends on the prefrontal cortex subsystem responsible for impulse control (response inhibition)
The ability to consciously redirect attention and reframe thoughts to prevent an undesirable response from fully initiating
Self-evaluation is the process; self-appraisal is the specific assessment; self-esteem is the global baseline
State self-esteem fluctuates; trait self-esteem is the habitual baseline supported by self-narrative and physiology
Sociometer theory: self-esteem tracks social acceptance rather than being a goal in itself. Low self-esteem inhibits adventurous behaviour (you sense a lack of support); high self-esteem encourages it.
Much of the self is narrative-constructed, so we often steer it in desirable directions
Controlled self-presentation is a normal part of being a person, not pathological or deceitful
Social rejection and ostracism damage trait self-esteem and reduce access to relational self-definition
The sociometer theory explains why social media "likes" feel so consequential: self-esteem literally tracks perceived social acceptance, so each metric registers as a signal about your standing. The individualism/collectivism distinction explains cross-cultural differences in everything from parenting styles to workplace expectations.
Students often think "the self is an illusion" means the self does not exist. It does exist; what is illusory is its apparent unity and simplicity.
Students assume self-knowledge is innate and primary. Empirical evidence suggests we learn about ourselves the same way we learn about others: through observation.
Students sometimes treat individualism as the natural or default human orientation. Collectivism is historically older and remains the norm in most of the world.
Students confuse self-presentation with dishonesty. Managed self-presentation is a normal, adaptive part of social life.
⚠️ Be able to distinguish the experiential self ("I") from the narrative self ("Me") with examples.
⚠️ Explain what it means to say the self is "illusory" and what Dennett's narrative centre of gravity adds.
⚠️ Know the three definitions of self-concept (individual, relational, collective) and how they map onto individualism and collectivism.
⚠️ Know the sociometer theory and how self-esteem adaptively changes behaviour.
⚠️ Be able to explain response inhibition as the cognitive basis of self-control.
⚠️ Know what split-brain research demonstrates about the unity of the self.
The "I" refers to the ______ self, while the "Me" refers to the ______ self. (experiential; narrative/remembered)
True or False: The illusory self means the self does not exist. (False, it exists but appears more unified than it really is.)
______ theory says self-esteem tracks social acceptance. (Sociometer)
True or False: Individualism is the older cultural orientation. (False, collectivism is older.)
The cognitive process primarily responsible for self-control is called ______. (Response inhibition / impulse control)
Q: What is the main, useful division to make when discussing the self?
A: Between "I" (experiential self) and "Me" (narrative/remembered self).
Q: What does it mean to say the self is "illusory"?
A: It appears to be a unitary "thing," but is really many processes working together.
Q: In what way is the illusory self our "narrative centre of gravity"?
A: It is a descriptive abstraction, useful for summarising everything we do via the intentional stance.
Q: What happens when you split the left and right cortical hemispheres?
A: They function as two independent brains with a large shared history.
Q: Which cultural orientation is older, collectivism or individualism?
A: Collectivism. Individualism is a cultural invention of nation states.
Q: What cognitive process is primarily responsible for self-control?
A: Response inhibition (also known as impulse control).
Q: How is behaviour adaptively changed by low self-esteem?
A: We become less adventurous, because we sense a lack of social support.
Q: Is controlled self-presentation pathological or deceitful?
A: No, it is a normal part of the self to take on aspects that are performative.
Q: What impact do social rejection and ostracism have on the socially constructed self?
A: They damage trait self-esteem and reduce access to relational self-definition.
The narrative centre of gravity and the intentional stance (Week 1) are directly linked: the illusory self is what makes the intentional stance possible. The social construction of self feeds into attribution biases (Week 4), because how we explain others' behaviour depends on how we construct their "self." Self-esteem and self-presentation connect to attitudes and impression management in Week 6.
Cartesian dualism, Descartes, ghost in the machine, material self, mind-body problem, experiential self, narrative self, I and Me, William James, illusory self, narrative centre of gravity, Daniel Dennett, intentional stance, corpus callosum, split-brain, self-concept, individual definition, relational definition, collective definition, individualism, collectivism, nation state, self-control, response inhibition, impulse control, prefrontal cortex, self-evaluation, self-appraisal, self-esteem, state self-esteem, trait self-esteem, sociometer theory, social acceptance, self-presentation, impression management, social rejection, ostracism, PSY 201, NYU social psychology midterm