Moral Sentiment, Pedagogy of Care, and Learning Ethics -- Ethics and Analytics in Health Psychology, PSY 320
Source: Course readings, lecture notes
Difficulty: Intermediate to Advanced | Prerequisites: Familiarity with the Duty of Care, Care Ethics, and Social Justice topics from this course.
This is where the course pulls its threads together. The earlier topics established that duty of care cannot be captured by rules alone (Duty of Care), that ethics is relational and context-bound (Care Ethics), and that systemic structures shape who receives care (Social Justice). This final topic asks: if ethics is not about following rules, how do people actually become ethical? The answer draws on David Hume's moral sentiment theory, Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, and contemporary work on empathy and pedagogy of care. The upshot is that ethics is learned through experience, community, and culture, not through memorising principles. This has direct implications for how health psychology practitioners and data analysts should be trained.
Hume and Adam Smith argued that moral judgements arise from feelings and sentiments, not pure reason. The course extends this into education: if ethics is learned through experience and community rather than rules, then training ethical practitioners requires providing an ethical culture, diverse perspectives, and opportunities to develop empathy. You cannot teach someone to be ethical by handing them a checklist.
Moral sentiment (Hume)
The idea that moral distinctions depend on experiencing sentiments or feelings, rather than relying exclusively on reason. In simple terms, we feel the difference between right and wrong before we reason about it.
Moral sense
A learned capacity to experience ethical responses. This is not a theory of innateness: we learn ethics, but we learn them in such a way that we feel or experience a moral sense, rather than fully articulating it as a set of propositions.
Theory of Moral Sentiments (Adam Smith)
Smith's argument that virtue and vice are defined by their reference to the sentiments of others. To be virtuous is to deserve love and reward; to be vicious is to deserve hatred and punishment. These are social judgements, not private calculations.
Empathy
The capacity to perceive and respond to the experiences of others. The course distinguishes cognitive empathy (understanding what another person feels) from emotional empathy (actually feeling what they feel). Both are relevant to ethical practice.
Pedagogy of care
An interdisciplinary approach to education that places caring relationships at the centre of teaching and learning, drawing on care ethics (Noddings, Gilligan) and trauma-informed practice.
Ethics alarms (Jack Marshall)
"The feelings in your gut, the twinges in your conscience, and the sense of caution in your brain when situations involving choices of right and wrong are beginning to develop." Think of it as your internal ethical early-warning system.
Heidegger's "constituted as care"
Heidegger observes that human beings are fundamentally "constituted as care": we work interpretively and self-interpretively according to our purposes and concerns. In pedagogy, this care is motivated by responsibility rather than pleasure or curiosity.
Sentiment over reason
Hume argued that moral distinctions depend on experiencing sentiments or feelings, not on the exclusive employment of reason.
This is not a claim that morality is innate. The idea is that we learn ethics, but what we learn is experienced as a felt moral sense rather than a set of rules we consciously apply.
Scepticism about practical reason
Hume inherited from Hobbes and Hutcheson a project of detaching ethical theory from certain forms of power, including the power of self-determination and the normative power of reason (Pink, 2020).
The question becomes: can we make sense of ethical normativity without these forms of power, and what price do we pay in giving them up?
The role of conversation and community
Hume says our sense of humanity allows us to form general views about what is useful and agreeable.
We do this on the basis of conversations and debates in which we must make ourselves mutually intelligible to one another (Taylor, 2013).
"It takes a community to learn ethics": all we do, all we experience, is the data from which a person develops an ethical sense.
Ethics as subsymbolic
Ethics, in this view, is not a matter of rationality (contra Kant) but rather one of sympathy.
How we react in a particular case depends on our ethical background and is the result of multiple simultaneous factors, not "large-print key statements."
Virtue as social recognition
Smith writes: "To be amiable and to be meritorious; that is, to deserve love and to deserve reward, are the great characters of virtue; and to be odious and punishable, of vice."
These characters "have an immediate reference to the sentiments of others." Virtue is not defined by its own self-regard but by its capacity to excite love and gratitude in other people.
Connection to care ethics
Smith's framework supports the care ethics view that morality is fundamentally relational: it lives in the responses of others, not in abstract principles.
The "knower" is an irreducibly normative and social concept; being a knower involves demands for ethically laden recognition (Congdon).
Ethics alarms
Jack Marshall (ProEthics) describes "ethics alarms" as the gut feelings, twinges of conscience, and sense of caution that arise when right-and-wrong situations develop.
The better your ethics alarm works and the sooner it goes off, the more likely you are to do the right thing.
Creating an ethical culture is a shared obligation: everyone needs to think critically about right and wrong and not hesitate to communicate those opinions.
Cognitive vs. emotional empathy
Cognitive empathy is understanding what another person feels (perspective-taking).
Emotional empathy is actually sharing or mirroring the other person's emotional state.
Both are relevant to ethical practice in health psychology.
Empathy online
Research (Osler) argues that empathy takes place online as well as in person: "we can empathetically perceive others 'at a distance' from their physical bodies."
Technologically mediated interactions (video calls, online learning) can sustain empathic connection, though the mechanisms differ.
Empathy as design principle
Ethics as empathy means "thinking through and prototyping the experience of those involved" (Drew, 2018).
In data projects, these moments of interaction are called "touchpoints," and improving their experience improves the likelihood the service achieves its intended impact.
Feminist design in hiring algorithms seeks equity: "that job candidates be able to participate in the hiring process on an equal footing" (Payton).
The danger of confusing measurement with value
The course warns against assuming that what we measure is the same as what we value.
Example: if we counted everything we spent money on and declared "this is what we value," that would be a distorted picture. GDP measures economic activity but misses wellbeing, sustainability, and social connection.
Heidegger and care as constitutive
Heidegger observes that human beings are "constituted as care." We interpret the world according to our purposes and concerns.
In pedagogy, unlike reading a paper or pondering a remark, care is motivated by responsibility, not pleasure or curiosity (Danner, via Friesen).
Pedagogical relationships are marked by an asymmetry between the one who takes responsibility and the one for whom they are responsible. But the responsible one is also vulnerable, fallible, and in a position to learn.
The burden of care
Campbell (2020): "Our profession is distinguished by emotional commitment, compassion, and a strong ethic of care, but this burden of care is unevenly distributed across the academy."
The burden falls disproportionately on traditionally marginalised workers, and because caring is often considered "women's work," the bulk falls on women.
Educational technologists absorb the worries and fears of colleagues: "the role of a forward-facing educational technologist is care work."
Trauma-informed pedagogy
Relationships are key to resilience. Teachers should foster relationships and "be crystal, crystal clear with students that you miss them and you care about them" (Venet).
People affected by trauma sometimes interpret neutral signals as negative, so impersonal check-in emails can have unintended consequences.
The person receiving care must experience it as such (Noddings/Costa).
Every piece of research on trauma-informed care insists that the trauma survivor is constantly empowered to make their own decisions about their care.
Care as practice, not sentiment
Jesse Stommel: "Care is a practice; care is pedagogical."
Authentic care for open knowledge practices, rather than emotionally driven intimacy, is a more sustainable model within professional boundaries.
"Knowledge authority" (Christie and Verran) is the practice, role, and responsibility of custodians to care for knowledge, enriching instruction and creating space for multiple perspectives.
Concern about care limiting agency
Dave White raises the concern that excessive "care" can limit student agency by restricting choices.
Stephen Ball frames education as self-formation: "the formation of moral subjectivity, a form of politics, and a relation to ethics rather than to truth."
What Gilligan et al. teach us
We are not going to be able to base the ethics of analytics on rules or principles.
Ethics is a matter of a community as an entire system, rather than one individual making a decision.
We need to keep in mind how we are all connected.
What matters is how we learn to be ethical in the first place, as opposed to the specific statement of a set of rules defining what it is to be ethical.
The student's mind as a complex system
The student's mind is at least as complex as social networks.
What they learn is going to be based on the data, i.e. the totality of the input.
This cannot be corrected simply by rote or by rules.
What this means for teaching
We have to provide an ethical culture rather than emphasis on following rules.
Diversity of perspective to create a wider sense of community.
Encouragement of openness and interaction (art, drama, etc.) to develop empathy and the capacity to see from the perspective of others.
Education should be about helping young people "be in the world," not just about academic knowledge.
We need to acknowledge the impact of difficult times on wellbeing and cognitive capacity, for students, teachers, and supporters alike (Bali).
The ethical concept, summarised
Traditional ethics was charged with favouring "male" ways of moral reasoning: rules, rights, universality, impartiality.
Feminist ethics elevates: relationships, responsibilities, particularity, partiality.
Jaggar (1992) notes that traditional ethics underrated culturally feminine traits like "interdependence, community, connection, sharing, emotion, body, trust, absence of hierarchy, nature, immanence, process, joy, peace, and life."
The duty of care, understood through this lens, is not a rigid set of principles but an attitude or approach, derived from one's own lived experiences, and based on compassion rather than "rights" or "fairness."
Students often think "moral sentiment" means morality is purely emotional or irrational. Hume's point is that sentiment and reason work together, but sentiment comes first; it is not a rejection of thought.
Students sometimes assume the pedagogy of care is about being lenient or lowering standards. It is about building relationships and an ethical culture that supports rigorous learning.
Students may conflate cognitive empathy (understanding) with emotional empathy (feeling). Both matter, and they are distinct capacities.
Students sometimes believe that an ethical culture is just "being nice." The course argues it involves diverse perspectives, open interaction, critical thinking, and a willingness to communicate opinions about right and wrong.
⚠️ Be able to explain Hume's moral sentiment theory and how it differs from Kantian ethics.
⚠️ Know Adam Smith's argument that virtue and vice are defined by reference to the sentiments of others.
⚠️ Understand the distinction between cognitive and emotional empathy.
⚠️ Be prepared to explain why the course concludes that ethics cannot be taught through rules alone.
⚠️ Know the key principles of pedagogy of care and trauma-informed pedagogy.
⚠️ Be able to discuss the "burden of care" and who bears it disproportionately.
True or False: Hume argued that moral judgements are based entirely on rational calculation. (False; he argued they depend on sentiments and feelings.)
Fill in the blank: Adam Smith argued that virtue is defined by its capacity to excite ______ and ______ in other people. (love, gratitude)
True or False: Cognitive empathy and emotional empathy are the same thing. (False; cognitive empathy is understanding, emotional empathy is feeling.)
Fill in the blank: The course concludes that we need to provide an ethical ______ rather than emphasise following rules. (culture)
True or False: The burden of care in higher education falls equally on all members of staff. (False; it falls disproportionately on marginalised workers and women.)
Q: What is Hume's moral sentiment theory, and how does it differ from Kant's approach to ethics?
A: Hume argued that moral distinctions depend on experiencing sentiments or feelings, not on pure reason. Kant, by contrast, grounded ethics in rational principles and duty. For Hume, we feel the difference between right and wrong; for Kant, we reason our way to it. The course sides with Hume's view that ethics is learned through experience, not derived from abstract rules.
Q: How does Adam Smith define virtue and vice in The Theory of Moral Sentiments?
A: Smith defines virtue as that which deserves love and reward, and vice as that which deserves hatred and punishment. Crucially, these judgements have "an immediate reference to the sentiments of others." Virtue is social: it is defined not by self-regard but by the responses it evokes in other people.
Q: What is the "burden of care" in higher education, and who bears it?
A: The burden of care refers to the emotional commitment, compassion, and care work that sustains educational communities. Campbell (2020) argues this burden is unevenly distributed, falling disproportionately on traditionally marginalised workers and on women, because caring is often treated as "women's work."
Q: Why does the course argue that ethics cannot be taught through rules alone? What should replace or supplement rules-based teaching?
A: Because ethical judgement, like professional competence, is recognised through an overall approach and attitude, not via checklists. The student's mind is a complex system, and what they learn is based on the totality of input. The course recommends providing an ethical culture, diversity of perspective, and encouragement of openness and interaction (art, drama, empathy-building exercises) rather than relying on memorised codes of conduct.
Q: What is the difference between cognitive empathy and emotional empathy, and why does it matter?
A: Cognitive empathy is the intellectual capacity to understand what another person is feeling (perspective-taking). Emotional empathy is actually sharing or mirroring their emotional state. Both are relevant to ethical practice: cognitive empathy helps with clinical judgement, while emotional empathy motivates caring action. The absence of either can lead to ethical failures in health psychology and data analytics.
This topic is the capstone. The Duty of Care topic established that rules and checklists are insufficient. Care Ethics (Gilligan, Noddings, Tronto) showed what a relational, context-bound ethic looks like. Social Justice showed who is harmed when care is absent and how structural power shapes ethical outcomes. This topic explains how ethical people are formed in the first place: through community, experience, and sentiment, not rules. The neuroscience material from the Care Ethics notes (oxytocin, pain circuitry, theory of mind) provides the biological substrate for the moral sentiments Hume and Smith describe.
moral sentiment, Hume, David Hume, Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, moral sense, empathy, cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, ethics alarms, pedagogy of care, trauma-informed pedagogy, burden of care, Heidegger, constituted as care, Eigenwelt, feminist ethics, Jaggar, Jesse Stommel, Maha Bali, Dave Cormier, Karen Costa, Lorna Campbell, knowledge authority, ethical culture, learning ethics, PSY 320, health psychology, Michigan State University