Care Ethics -- Ethics and Analytics in Health Psychology, PSY 320
Source: Course readings, lecture notes
Difficulty: Intermediate | Prerequisites: Familiarity with the Duty of Care topic and basic knowledge of deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics.
Care ethics is a feminist philosophical perspective that emerged in the 1980s as an alternative to the dominant moral theories (deontology, utilitarianism, justice theory). Where those theories rely on abstract principles and universal rules, care ethics starts from relationships and context. This topic is the philosophical heart of the course's argument that ethical behaviour in health psychology and data analytics cannot be reduced to following rules. It connects directly to the Duty of Care topic (why rules are insufficient) and to the Social Justice topic (who is harmed when care is absent). You should be comfortable with the idea that traditional ethics has been criticised for privileging "male" modes of reasoning before diving in.
Care ethics argues that morality is rooted in relationships and responsiveness to particular others, not in universal principles. Pioneered by Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings, it reframes ethics around empathy, interdependence, and the lived experience of caring. The course uses it to argue that ethical analytics requires an attitude of care, not just compliance with rules.
Care ethics (ethics of care)
A feminist philosophical perspective that uses a relational and context-bound approach toward morality and decision making, standing in contrast to principle-based theories like Kantian deontology and utilitarianism. Think of it as ethics that starts from "who is in front of me and what do they need?" rather than "what does the rule say?"
Morality of rights vs. morality of responsibility
Gilligan's distinction: the "morality of rights" emphasises autonomy, independence, and universal principles (Kohlberg's model). The "morality of responsibility" emphasises relationships, interdependence, and responsiveness to others. In simple terms, rights-based morality asks "what am I entitled to?"; responsibility-based morality asks "who depends on me?"
Natural care vs. ethical care (Noddings)
Natural care is the spontaneous, pre-ethical impulse to care for another (like a mother for a child). Ethical care arises when natural care fails and we must consciously choose to respond to another's needs. Think of natural care as instinct and ethical care as the deliberate decision to act on that instinct.
Caring-for vs. caring-about (Noddings)
"Caring-for" is the hands-on application of care. "Caring-about" is a state of nurturing caring intentions without direct action. In simple terms, caring-for is doing the work; caring-about is holding the concern.
The one-caring and the cared-for
Noddings' terms for the two parties in a caring relationship. The one-caring acts in response to a perceived need, feeling and sensing what the cared-for is experiencing.
Attentiveness, responsibility, competence, responsiveness (Tronto)
Tronto's four sub-elements of care, understood simultaneously as stages, virtuous dispositions, or goals. Together they describe the full arc of caring: noticing a need, accepting the obligation, having the skill to help, and considering the other's perspective.
Oxytocin (OXT)
A neuropeptide that plays a significant role in self-care and offspring care, increasingly important in social attachment over evolutionary time. Think of it as the neurochemical substrate of caring behaviour.
Challenge to Kohlberg
Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice (1982) disputed Lawrence Kohlberg's model of moral development, which described women as stuck at an interpersonal stage short of full moral development.
Gilligan argued Kohlberg wrongly prioritised a "morality of rights" and independence from others as better than, rather than merely different from, a "morality of responsibility" and intimate relationships.
The care perspective
Women's construction of moral problems centres on care and responsibility in relationships, rather than rights and rules.
The logic underlying an ethic of care is a psychological logic of relationships, contrasting with the formal logic of fairness that informs the justice approach.
Gilligan characterised this as a difference of theme, not of gender.
Three stages of moral development (Gilligan)
Stage 1: Focus on the self and survival.
Stage 2: "Maternal morality": the Good is defined in terms of caring for others. But too much focus on others leads to imbalance.
Stage 3: Balancing self with others, recognising that self and others are interdependent. This is the central insight: self and others are not opposed but interconnected.
Caring as the foundation of morality
Nel Noddings argued that caring is the foundation of morality and that relationships are ontologically basic to humanity.
Identity is defined by the set of relationships individuals have with other humans.
Since the impulse to care is universal, caring ethics is freed from the charge of moral relativism to the same degree as virtue ethics.
Natural care vs. ethical care
Natural care is pre-ethical: the spontaneous caretaking of a mother for a child, or a maternal animal for offspring.
When natural care fails (when we do not spontaneously feel the impulse to help), ethical care kicks in: a conscious choice to respond to another's needs.
Natural care is preferable; ethical care is the backup.
The mechanics of caring
The one-caring acts in response to a perceived need on the part of the cared-for.
The act is motivated by an apprehension of the cared-for's reality: the one-caring feels and senses what the cared-for is experiencing.
This does not mean doing exactly what the cared-for desires. The one-caring considers the cared-for's point of view, assessment of need, and expectations.
The person receiving care must experience it as such (a point emphasised by Karen Costa in relation to trauma-informed pedagogy).
Caring-for vs. caring-about
"Caring-for" refers to hands-on application of caring services.
"Caring-about" refers to nurturing caring ideas or intentions.
Noddings argued there is a lesser obligation to care for distant others if there is no hope that care will be completed. This claim proved controversial and was later revised.
Tronto and Fischer's definition
Care is "a species of activity that includes everything we do to maintain, contain, and repair our 'world' so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment."
Tronto's four sub-elements of care
Attentiveness: a proclivity to become aware of need.
Responsibility: a willingness to respond and take care of need.
Competence: the skill of providing good and successful care.
Responsiveness: consideration of the position of others as they see it, and recognition of the potential for abuse in care.
Three overlapping meanings (Ruddick)
An ethic defined in opposition to justice.
A kind of labour.
A particular relationship.
Care as embodied (Hamington)
Care is an approach to personal and social morality that shifts ethical considerations to context, relationships, and affective knowledge. Its embodied dimension must be recognised.
Care as virtue vs. care as practice
Some (Rachels, Slote) argue care ethics is a species of virtue ethics, with care as a central virtue.
Held and Kittay argue care is better understood as a practice and value rather than a virtue, because treating it as a virtue risks "losing sight of it as work."
Key criticisms of care ethics
Slave morality: care ethics may valorise the oppression of women (Puka, Card, Davion).
Empirically flawed: Gilligan based conclusions on narrow, homogenous samples.
Theoretically indistinct: it may not be sufficiently different from liberal concepts like autonomy and justice.
Parochial: it may obscure larger social dynamics by focusing on proximate relationships.
Essentialist: it may reinforce sex stereotypes by linking care to "women's nature."
Ambiguous: it fails to offer concrete guidance for ethical action.
Co-optable: Black and Indigenous scholars note that care and empathy have historically been used to justify colonial violence.
Evolutionary roots
All animals are minimally social (at least to reproduce). Social animals extend care to others through evolutionary mechanisms.
These mechanisms vary greatly from species to species but share a common starting point. The human brain has essentially the same architecture as 300,000 years ago.
Oxytocin and attachment
OXT and AVP peptides play a significant role in care, originally related to regulation of water and minerals, and over time became increasingly important in self-care and offspring care.
Placental hormones act on neurons and create nesting urges. Hormonal releases can be triggered by adoption as well as biological birth.
"Maternal bonding" is caused by endogenous opiates.
Pain and social attachment
The insula and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) respond to both physical pain and social pain.
"Protect myself" tactics feel neurologically the same as "protect mine" tactics.
Feelings of remorse, guilt, and shame commonly follow injuring another, except in psychopaths.
Prediction and theory of mind
Prediction serves survival and well-being and extends to representation.
In humans, this capacity leads to a schema of others' mental states: a theory of mind.
Modest changes in neural capacity lead to significant new patterns of behaviour.
Cultural vs. biological evolution
Cultural evolution can happen more rapidly than biological evolution and can have significant advantages.
There is no "writing gene" or "barter gene"; these are cultural developments.
Statements of universal morality apply at best to recent society, not to the deep evolutionary past.
Care ethics shapes how trauma-informed pedagogy works: educators are encouraged to be "crystal clear with students that you miss them and you care about them" (Venet). In health psychology, the principle that "the person receiving care must experience it as such" (Noddings/Costa) directly informs patient-centred care models. In data analytics, care ethics asks whether the people affected by an algorithm experience its outputs as caring or harmful, regardless of what the developers intended.
Students often think care ethics is only about women or only relevant to women. Gilligan characterised the difference as one of theme, not gender.
Students sometimes assume care ethics means being "nice" to everyone. It does not. Care requires competence, attentiveness, and responsiveness, not just good intentions.
Students may think care ethics has no place alongside "serious" ethical theories. It is a fully developed moral framework with its own logic, not a soft alternative to "real" ethics.
Students sometimes conflate natural care (instinct) with ethical care (deliberate choice). Noddings makes a clear distinction between them.
⚠️ Be able to contrast Gilligan's "morality of responsibility" with Kohlberg's "morality of rights."
⚠️ Know Noddings' distinction between natural care and ethical care, and between caring-for and caring-about.
⚠️ Be able to list Tronto's four sub-elements of care (attentiveness, responsibility, competence, responsiveness).
⚠️ Understand the major criticisms of care ethics, especially the essentialism and parochialism objections.
⚠️ Be prepared to explain how oxytocin and neural pain systems connect to the evolutionary basis of care.
True or False: Gilligan argued that Kohlberg's model was wrong because men are more moral than women. (False; she argued his model was biased, not that one gender was more moral.)
Fill in the blank: Noddings distinguished between ______ care (spontaneous) and ______ care (deliberate). (natural, ethical)
True or False: Tronto's four sub-elements of care include "attentiveness" and "responsiveness." (True)
Fill in the blank: Oxytocin plays a significant role in ______ and offspring care. (self-care)
True or False: Care ethics argues that universal moral principles are the best guide for ethical decision-making. (False)
Q: How does Gilligan's model of moral development differ from Kohlberg's?
A: Kohlberg prioritised a "morality of rights" based on autonomy, independence, and universal principles. Gilligan argued this model marginalised the "morality of responsibility," which centres relationships, interdependence, and care for particular others. She contended the two are different, not ranked.
Q: Explain Noddings' concepts of natural care and ethical care.
A: Natural care is the spontaneous, pre-ethical impulse to care for another (e.g. a parent for a child). Ethical care arises when that spontaneous impulse is absent and one must consciously choose to respond to another's needs. Natural care is preferable; ethical care is the deliberate backup.
Q: What are Tronto's four sub-elements of care?
A: Attentiveness (noticing need), responsibility (willingness to respond), competence (having the skill to help), and responsiveness (considering the other's perspective and recognising the potential for abuse in care).
Q: Name two major criticisms of care ethics and briefly explain each.
A: (1) Essentialism: care ethics may reinforce gender stereotypes by linking care to "women's nature." (2) Parochialism: by focusing on proximate relationships, it may overlook larger systemic injustices and broader social dynamics.
Q: How does the neuroscience material support care ethics?
A: It shows that caring has evolutionary and neurochemical roots (oxytocin, pain circuitry in the insula and ACC). Social pain activates the same neural pathways as physical pain, suggesting that care for others is not just a cultural overlay but is built into mammalian biology.
Care ethics is the philosophical foundation for the Pedagogy of Care and the Burden of Care topics later in the course. It also underpins the Social Justice and Equity material, where care ethics intersects with intersectionality and questions about who bears the emotional labour of caring. The Moral Sentiment topic (Hume, Adam Smith) complements care ethics by arguing that ethics is learned through feeling and experience, not abstract reason.
care ethics, ethics of care, feminist ethics, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, Nel Noddings, caring, natural care, ethical care, caring-for, caring-about, one-caring, cared-for, Joan Tronto, attentiveness, responsibility, competence, responsiveness, Kohlberg, morality of rights, morality of responsibility, oxytocin, maternal bonding, theory of mind, virtue ethics, deontology, utilitarianism, PSY 320, health psychology