Difficulty: Intermediate | Prerequisites: Weeks 1–3 notes (especially the intentional stance, theory-ladenness, and the illusory self)
Weeks 4 and 5 explore how we make sense of other people's behaviour (attribution) and how we make decisions under uncertainty (judgement and heuristics). Week 4 introduces the biases that distort our explanations of behaviour, including the fundamental attribution error and self-serving biases, then extends into stereotypes, ideology and the just world hypothesis. Week 5 shifts to decision-making: cognitive shortcuts (heuristics), the dual-process model (System 1 and System 2), and how all of this feeds into moral judgement. Together these weeks explain why we so often misjudge others and why our moral reasoning is rarely as rational as it feels.
We explain other people's behaviour by making attributions, but we do so with systematic biases: we over-attribute others' actions to their character while excusing our own with circumstances. Our decisions rely heavily on fast, automatic heuristics rather than careful reasoning, and most moral judgement is intuitive rationalisation dressed up as deliberation.
Social cognition
The cognitive processes (information processing and brain subsystems) employed in perceiving, understanding and meaningfully reacting to social phenomena.
Attribution
The intuitive way we attach meaning to action via the intentional stance: locating the cause of behaviour. Attributions vary along four dimensions: internal vs. external, stable vs. unstable, controllable vs. uncontrollable, intentional vs. accidental.
Covariation theory of attribution
The theory that we infer causation when events appear to covary. Uses three evaluations: consensus, distinctiveness and consistency.
Consensus
Is everyone doing it, or just one person? High consensus suggests an external cause; low consensus suggests internal.
Distinctiveness
Is this how this person usually reacts? High distinctiveness suggests external; low suggests internal.
Consistency
Do they act this way all the time? High consistency is consistent with an internal attribution; low consistency undermines it.
Discounting principle
Once one plausible cause occurs to us, we discount other possibilities. If you have a workable attribution, you are unlikely to seek another.
Augmentation principle
The apparent influence of a particular cause seems higher when contradictory forces are present. Someone who passes a test on no sleep seems even more talented.
Fundamental attribution error (FAE)
Our tendency to disproportionately explain others' behaviour with reference to stable, internal, intentional traits or dispositions, while explaining our own behaviour (especially failures) with situational factors.
Actor-observer bias
The conceptual extension of the FAE: we readily consider situational factors for our own behaviour but rarely apply them to others.
Self-serving biases
Our tendency to see the world in a manner that favours our own interests and supports our self-esteem. We use stable internal attributions for our successes and unstable external attributions for our shortcomings, reversing the pattern for other people.
Stereotype
Sweeping generalisations of social groups that shape our expectations and social judgements of group members. Not always factually wrong, but their use undermines autonomy.
Schemata
Learned knowledge-structures that shape thinking. We process schema-consistent information more quickly, focus attention on it more easily, and use tacit inferences to make inconsistent details fit.
Illusory correlation
Perceiving a correlation between two things (e.g. an ethnic group and a behaviour) that does not exist or is far weaker than believed. Forms the basis of prejudice and discrimination.
Prejudice
Negative attitudes based on group membership.
Discrimination
Unfair behaviour based in prejudiced beliefs.
Confirmation bias
The tendency to search for, interpret or recall information that confirms what we already think, believe or suspect, overlooking disconfirming evidence.
Ideology
A socially transmitted set of beliefs, expectations and values that structure one's intersubjective experience.
Ideo-attribution effect
The influence political ideology has on patterns of attribution. In US politics, the politically right-wing tend to overuse internal attributions; the left-wing overuse situational attributions.
Just world hypothesis
The belief that the world is inherently fair: people get what they deserve and deserve what they get. Partially accounts for demographic differences between political orientations.
Judgement
Any change in cognitive representation that corresponds to information about changes in the world. A step in decision-making.
Heuristic
A rule-of-thumb decision-rule: a highly specialised neural circuit that makes certain judgements automatically in response to stimuli.
Availability heuristic
Judging the likelihood of events by how readily similar examples come to mind. Parents fear child predators more than car accidents despite the latter being 75 times more lethal.
Representativeness heuristic
Judging situations as more likely the closer they conform to a stereotyped expectation. People estimate large men are more likely to be truckers than retail workers, when retail is twice as likely.
Affect heuristic
Assuming the safety or danger of a situation directly corresponds with the emotion it evokes. We worry about sharks at beaches but not about setting our pyjamas on fire.
Dual-process approach
The functional metaphor that the mind operates as two parallel systems: System 1 (fast, automatic, emotional, stereotypic, subconscious) and System 2 (slow, effortful, logical, calculating, conscious).
System 1
A large collection of hyper-specialised neural circuits (cognitive modules) honed by experience and heredity to solve specific everyday problems. Fast, automatic and associative.
System 2
A coordinated set of control and integration processes communicating via working memory. Slow, effortful and conscious. Engaged when a task is difficult enough to demand attention.
Stroop effect
The delay experienced when a task requires actively suppressing an automatic System 1 response, such as naming the ink colour of a colour word printed in a different colour.
Reasoning
Deliberate, conscious, step-by-step evaluation using System 2 to reach a conclusion.
Rationalisation
System 1 produces an intuitive response, and System 2 is employed after the fact to construct a plausible justification for it.
Social intuitionist approach
The theory that most moral judgement is rationalisation masquerading as reasoning: our decisions are guided by heuristics and affect, and much apparent reasoning is after-the-fact justification.
Moral dumbfounding
The state of viscerally feeling something is morally wrong but being unable to articulate a rationale for why.
Moral foundations theory
Identifies five intuitive domains relevant to moral decisions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, Purity/Sanctity.
When we explain behaviour, our attributions fall along four axes: internal vs. external, stable vs. unstable, controllable vs. uncontrollable, intentional vs. accidental.
We infer causation when events appear to covary, using three cues:
Consensus: high (everyone does it) suggests external; low suggests internal
Distinctiveness: high (unusual reaction for this person) suggests external; low suggests internal
Consistency: high (they always do this) supports internal; low undermines attribution
Two supplementary principles:
Discounting: once one cause occurs to us, we stop looking for others
Augmentation: a cause seems stronger when it produces its effect despite opposing forces
Fundamental attribution error (FAE): we over-attribute others' behaviour to stable, internal traits while explaining our own failures with situational factors
Actor-observer bias: an extension of the FAE; we consider situational explanations for ourselves but rarely for others
Self-serving biases: we take credit for successes (stable, internal) and blame failures on circumstances (unstable, external), reversing the pattern for other people. Collectivist cultures show diminished or even inverted self-serving bias patterns.
Social identity theory involves three processes: social categorisation (what groups exist?), social identification (which are mine?), social comparison (are mine better?)
Ingroup favouritism and outgroup homogenisation are extensions of self-serving biases to the group level
Schemata shape thinking: we process schema-consistent information faster, attend to it more, and use tacit inferences to reconcile inconsistencies
Illusory correlations form the basis of prejudice and discrimination
Confirmation bias perpetuates stereotypes by directing attention toward confirming evidence
Ideology structures intersubjective experience through socially transmitted beliefs, expectations and values
Ideo-attribution effect: political orientation shapes attribution patterns (right-wing tends toward internal attributions; left-wing toward situational)
Just world hypothesis: the belief that people get what they deserve. Influences whether we blame the person or the situation, and partially accounts for political differences.
A judgement is any change in cognitive representation that corresponds to information about changes in the world; it is a step in decision-making
Indecision is costly: paralysed inaction leads to discoordination and lost opportunities
Natural selection has favoured "good enough" over "perfect," producing a trade-off between decision quality and expedience
The majority of mental processing is done by unconscious heuristics (implicit cognition)
Heuristics are highly specialised neural circuits that make automatic rule-of-thumb judgements
Kahneman and Tversky largely founded behavioural economics by studying these shortcuts
Three pervasive heuristics:
Availability heuristic: judging likelihood by how readily examples come to mind
Representativeness heuristic: judging likelihood by how closely something matches a stereotyped expectation
Affect heuristic: judging safety or danger by the emotion a situation evokes
Emotions are control systems designed by natural selection to mobilise action in socially important situations
Each emotion corresponds to a judgement and primes a type of response:
Anger: judged wronged; primes aggressive punishment
Fear: judged in danger; primes vigilance and evasion
Sadness: judged a loss; primes withdrawal and signalling for help
Disgust: judged corruption; primes avoidance and expulsion
System 1: fast, automatic, emotional, stereotypic, subconscious. A huge collection of cognitive modules solving specific everyday problems.
System 2: slow, effortful, logical, calculating, conscious. A coordinated set of control processes communicating via working memory, engaged only when a task demands attention.
System 2 never works alone; it is always an optional layer on top of System 1's automatic outputs
The Stroop effect demonstrates the cost of suppressing System 1: naming the ink colour of an incongruent colour word is slower because it requires overriding the automatic reading response
Reasoning: System 2 is employed from the start to carefully evaluate a situation step by step
Rationalisation: System 1 produces an intuitive response first, and System 2 is recruited after the fact to construct a plausible justification
The social intuitionist approach argues that most moral judgement follows the rationalisation pattern; the metaphor is the elephant (System 1) and its rider, who acts as its PR spokesperson
Moral dumbfounding: viscerally feeling something is wrong but being unable to say why; supports the social intuitionist view
Moral foundations theory identifies five intuitive domains:
Harm/Care: whether someone suffers
Fairness/Reciprocity: sharing rules and proportionality
Ingroup/Loyalty: support for your people
Authority/Respect: observing tradition and hierarchy
Purity/Sanctity: avoidance of physical and symbolic corruption
The FAE is at work every time you judge a bad driver as "a menace" rather than someone who is distracted and underslept. Recognising the mitigating circumstances in others' lives is one of the best ways to train compassion. The availability heuristic explains why people fear flying more than driving, despite driving being far more dangerous: plane crashes are vivid and memorable, car accidents are routine.
Students often confuse the discounting and augmentation principles. Discounting is about ignoring alternative causes once one occurs to you. Augmentation is about a cause seeming stronger when it overcomes obstacles.
Students sometimes think the FAE means we never use situational explanations for others. We do, just disproportionately less often than for ourselves.
Students assume System 1 is "bad" and System 2 is "good." System 1 is efficient and correct most of the time; System 2 is costly and engaged only when necessary.
Students treat moral dumbfounding as a failure of intelligence. It is a universal feature of how moral cognition works.
⚠️ Know the three evaluations in the covariation theory (consensus, distinctiveness, consistency) and what high vs. low implies for each.
⚠️ Be able to distinguish the FAE, actor-observer bias and self-serving biases with examples.
⚠️ Name and define all three pervasive heuristics with real-world examples.
⚠️ Be able to compare reasoning and rationalisation in dual-process terms.
⚠️ Know the five moral foundations and the social intuitionist approach.
⚠️ Understand the ideo-attribution effect and the just world hypothesis.
The ______ principle says we stop looking for alternative causes once one occurs to us. (Discounting)
True or False: The FAE says we over-attribute our own behaviour to traits. (False, it applies to others' behaviour.)
System 1 is ______, ______ and ______; System 2 is ______, ______ and ______. (fast, automatic, subconscious; slow, effortful, conscious)
______ describes viscerally feeling something is morally wrong without being able to say why. (Moral dumbfounding)
True or False: The availability heuristic judges likelihood by similarity to a stereotype. (False, that is the representativeness heuristic. Availability judges by ease of recall.)
Q: What is attribution in a social psychology context?
A: The intuitive way we attach meaning to action via the intentional stance.
Q: What are the three evaluations in the covariation theory?
A: Consensus, distinctiveness and consistency.
Q: What is the fundamental attribution error?
A: We are disproportionately likely to use internal attributions for others' behaviour.
Q: What is the actor-observer bias?
A: In addition to the FAE, we attribute our own bad behaviour to circumstance.
Q: What is a cognitive heuristic?
A: An automatic rule-of-thumb decision.
Q: What is the availability heuristic?
A: Judging likelihood based on how readily examples come to mind.
Q: What is the dual-process approach?
A: The mind operates as two parallel systems, one fast (System 1) and one slow (System 2).
Q: What is rationalising according to the dual-process approach?
A: Accepting a judgement from System 1 and defending it using System 2.
Q: What is the social intuitionist approach to moral judgement?
A: That most moral judgement is rationalising masquerading as reasoning.
Q: What are the five domains of moral foundations theory?
A: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, Purity/Sanctity.
Attribution biases build directly on the intentional stance (Week 1) and the social construction of the self (Week 3). Self-serving biases connect to self-esteem and the sociometer theory (Week 3). Heuristics and the dual-process model reappear in Week 6 when distinguishing implicit from explicit attitudes, and social identity theory (introduced here through stereotypes) becomes central to conformity and social influence in Week 8.
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